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COPYRIGHT LAW
LANHAM ACT PROTECTIONS AFFORDED ARTISTIC WORK
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.
Encouragement of the arts by protection of the economic incen-
tives for artistic creation has always been the primary function of
American copyright law.' Accordingly, the remedies available under
the Copyright Act 2 are directed toward the prevention and redress
of economic loss suffered by the copyright holder. 3 Since the artist's
"moral right"' to claim authorship of his work and to prevent altera-
I The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish copyrights "[t]o promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts. . . ... U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. In the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1-216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), Congress sought to accomplish this purpose by giving a
"bonus" to authors and inventors by allowing them to control the sale and use of their works.
See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1909); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 555 (1973), discussed in Comment, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copy-
right Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1974). It is clear, however, that this reward ulti-
mately was intended to benefit not the author, but the public. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). It should be noted that in 1976 Congress
extensively revised the Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (effective Jan. 1,
1978) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (Supp 1976)).
3 Among the remedies available under the Copyright Act are: money damages for in-
fringement of both common law and statutory copyright; an injunction to restrain further
violations; an order requiring the articles alleged to infringe the copyright be impounded, and
upon a judicial finding of infringement, be destroyed; and finally, an award of costs and
attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 116 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For an exhaustive discussion of
these remedies, see 2 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 150-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
I In Europe, an artist's personal rights are protected under the theory of moral right. This
theory includes, in the broadest sense
the right to create and to publish in any form desired, the creator's right to claim
the paternity of his work, the right to prevent every deformation, mutilation or
other modification thereof, the right to withdraw and destroy the work, the prohibi-
tion against excessive criticism and the prohibition against all other injuries to the
creator's personality.
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators,
53 HARV. L. Rav. 554, 556 (1940) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Roeder]. Of these
rights, the right to prevent unconsented to alterations of the work and the right to claim
paternity are probably the most important. See Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Imple-
menting Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 Gao. L.J.
1539, 1540-41 (1972). Moral rights are personal, not property rights, and may be waived but
not assigned. Roeder, supra, at 564. These rights survive the death of the creator of the work
and may be enforced by his estate or family, thus protecting his reputation for the benefit of
his descendants, and, more importantly, protecting the work as part of a society's cultural
heritage. Id. at 574-75.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, an international
agreement which protects the rights of paternity and integrity, has been ratified by 65 na-
tions. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971) [hereinafter
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tion which may prejudice his reputation is not expressly protected
by the Copyright Act, courts have utilized such diverse theories as
defamation and libel,' unfair competition,6 privacy, 7 and contract
to fashion appropriate remedies. Following this ad hoc approach,
the Second Circuit, in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,9 held
that an artist who claims that unauthorized editing of a television
script impairs the integrity of his work may state a cause of action
under the Lanham Act (the Act),' ° a federal trademark statute. In
so holding, the court appears to have expanded the reach of the Act
to protect the artistic work itself, interpreting the statute as forbid-
ding not only misdescription of authorship, but also the actual dis-
semination of the work in a substantially altered form.
The plaintiffs in Gilliam, a group of British writers and per-
cited as Berne Convention]. For a discussion of the Berne Convention and the moral right
approach to copyright law in general, see 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 110; notes 38-43 and
accompanying text infra.
5 See, e.g., D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1st
Dep't), modified, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913), discussed in Comment, Toward Artistic
Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal
Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1548 n.55 (1972). In D'Altomonte, the court found that attribut-
ing to plaintiff, a respected author and lecturer, a news article not written by him, gave rise
to a cause of action for libel. 208 N.Y. at 597, 102 N.E. at 1101.
I See, e.g., Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939),
discussed in Roeder, supra note 4, at 567-68. The Prouty court found that "if the defendant
had appropriated, without plaintiff's consent, the plot and principal characters of
[plaintiff's] novel, and that the use being made of her literary production was such as to
injure the reputation of the work and of the author," relief would be available under the
doctrine of unfair competition. 26 F. Supp. at 266.
' The right to privacy encompasses the right to protect oneself from being misrepresented
to the public. Arguably, mutilation of a work of art may have an adverse impact not only on
the work itself but also on the public's attitude toward the artist. See, e.g., Williams v.
Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (unauthorized publica-
tion of lecture notes with plaintiff's name may jeopardize his professional standing and
constitute an invasion of his privacy). The assertion of a right to privacy affords limited
protection, however, since the right attaches only to those who are not public figures, and
the cause of action does not survive the death of the artist. See Comment, Toward Artistic
Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal
Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1548-50 (1972). In contrast, moral rights do survive the death
of the artist. See note 4 supra.
, See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (sale of abbreviated recordings
of plaintiff's music constituted breach of contract).
9 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
,o 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
. . . and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, . . . shall be
liable to a civil action by any person . . . who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1975 TERM
formers doing business under the name Monty Python, had con-
tracted with the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) to prepare
the scripts for a comedy series entitled "Monty Python's Flying
Circus."" The contract gave the writers a high degree of control over
any changes made in the script,12 and reserved to Monty Python all
rights in their work not otherwise given to BBC. Additionally, BBC
had authority under the agreement to license the broadcast of re-
cordings "in overseas territories.' 3 In July 1975, Time-Life Films,
which had acquired rights to distribute Monty Python programs in
the United States, arranged for the broadcast of the programs by the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC). Previously, programs in
the series had been shown in this country as originally recorded
without commercial interruption, both on public television and, to
a limited extent, on commercial television. Monty Python and BBC
apparently assumed that ABC also would broadcast the programs
in their entirety.'4 The first of the ABC broadcasts, however, was
severely edited to allow for commercials and eliminated material
ABC considered offensive or obscene by American standards.' 5
After a series of negotiations failed to resolve the dispute,
Monty Python sought a preliminary injunction against the second
ABC edited show 11 days prior to its scheduled broadcast. Although
" 538 F.2d at 17.
22 The pertinent portion of the BBC-Monty Python agreement stated:
When script alterations are necessary it is the intention of the BBC to make every
effort to inform and to reach agreement with the Writer. . . . [N]ecessary altera-
tions . . . shall be made by the Writer. . . . [Tihe BBC shall not without the
consent of the Writer or his agent. . . make any structural alterations as opposed
to minor alterations ....
Id. at 17 n.2.
12 Id. at 17. Pursuant to BBC's licensing authority, Time-Life was granted the rights to
distribute Monty Python programs in the United States. Id. at 17-18. The agreement between
BBC and Time-Life authorized Time-Life "to edit the programs only 'for the insertion of
commercials, applicable censorship or governmental. . . rules and regulations, and National
Association of Broadcasters and time segment requirements."' Id. at 18. Although the court's
opinion does not indicate the substance of the ABC agreement with Time-Life, presumably
ABC was also permitted to edit for commercial or censorship reasons. In comparing the BBC-
Monty Python contract with these later agreements, the court noted that BBC had granted
to Time-Life a power to make unilateral changes, a right which it did not possess. Id. at 21.
"1 Id. at 18. ABC had once before tried to acquire broadcast rights to Monty Python
programs, but the group rejected the proposed format, which would have included only
excerpts of various shows. Id. ABC's later contract with Time-Life provided that ABC would
broadcast two 90-minute specials each containing three 30-minute Monty Python programs.
The group's representative, seemingly aware that the scheduling allowed no time for commer-
cials, sought reassurances from BBC as to ABC's plans. BBC replied, "'we can only reassure
you that ABC have [sic] decided to run the programmes "back to back," and that there is
a firm undertaking not to segment them."' Id.
1" Id. at 18.
19771
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:349
the district court found that the plaintiffs' work had been impaired
and that the injury was irreparable,"8 Judge Lasker declined to issue
a preliminary injunction. The court believed that the factors favor-
ing issuance of a temporary injunction were outweighed by the prob-
able harm to ABC were the program to be enjoined on such short
notice. In denying the injunction, Judge Lasker was also influenced
by the existence of a serious question as to the ownership of the
copyright in the recorded programs. 17
On appeal, Judge Lumbard, speaking for the court in an opin-
ion filed several months after broadcast of the program originally
sought to be enjoined, agreed that the equities favored the plaintiff,
and directed the issuance of a preliminary injunction against any
further broadcasts.18 Examining the likelihood of damage to Monty
16 Id. After viewing the programs, District Judge Lasker concluded that plaintiffs' work
had been impaired since, in addition to the substantial amount of cutting, the editing had
,"caused the film or program . . . to lose its iconoclastic verve."' Id. The district court's
decision was delivered in an unreported, oral opinion.
11 Id. at 18-19. The district court, in denying the preliminary injunction, also observed
that the plaintiffs had exhibited "a somewhat disturbing casualness" in not seeking an
injunction until 11 days before the scheduled broadcast. Id. at 18, 25. Interpreting this remark
as implying that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches, the Second Circuit found that circum-
stances justified Monty Python's delay in seeking relief. Id. at 25. In particular, the court
noted that Monty Python was not aware of the editing until late November, when the group
viewed a tape of the first program. Negotiations between the parties in early December
further delayed the bringing of suit. Consequently, the court found that there was no undue
delay. Moreover, the Second Circuit indicated that ABC had not demonstrated prejudice
arising from any delay in the group's actions. Id. For a copyright infringement case in which
a two-month delay in seeking relief, while defendant incurred substantial promotional expen-
ses, was a factor considered by the court to justify denying plaintiffs' application for an
injunction, see Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The district court in Gilliam also denied relief because it was unclear whether BBC and
Time-Life were indispensable parties. 538 F.2d at 18, 25. The Second Circuit rejected the
contention that BBC had to be joined because it owned the copyright in the recorded pro-
gram, stating that all the owners of a copyright need not be joined as parties. Id. at 25-26;
accord, Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944);
Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Famous Music
Corp. v. Maholias, 53 F.R.D. 364 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Rather, equitable considerations should
determine in all instances whether a party is indispensable. 538 F.2d at 26. For rules govern-
ing joinder of parties in copyright cases, see R. NORDHAUS, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT §§ 96-99 (1971). In Gilliam, the Second Circuit concluded that neither BBC
nor Time-Life were indispensable since complete relief could be rendered between the parties
before the court. Further, the danger of inconsistent verdicts against ABC could be avoided
through the use of impleader. Finally, neither BBC nor Time-Life had claimed an interest in
the litigation. 538 F.2d at 25-26.
6 538 F.2d at 26. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953),
outlines the standards to be followed by a court in considering an application for a prelimi-
nary injunction. The plaintiff must show some chance of success on the merits-"it will
ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1975 TERM
Python if an injunction were denied, the Second Circuit held that
the district court's finding of irreparable harm was not clearly erro-
neous. Since Monty Python's work was not widely known in this
country, the nationwide broadcast of a program which
"misrepresented the quality of [their] work"' 9 would clearly cause
irremediable damage to the group's professional reputation. 2 The
court then declared that the injunction would not impose sufficient
hardship on ABC to justify its denial. Noting that the ABC show
had not been scheduled for rebroadcast, the court found that at the
time of the appeal the possibility of a significant financial loss or
adverse effect on ABC's relations with its affiliates was minimal. 21
Finally, the court determined that there was a substantial likeli-
more deliberate investigation." Id. at 740 (footnote omitted). Next, "[t]he judge must con-
sider whether irreparable harm is likely to result to [the] plaintiff if . . . the injunction is
denied. ... Id. at 743. Finally, the injury to the plaintiff must be balanced against "the
harm to [the] defendant likely to result if the relief is granted." Id. For applications of these
standards, see Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 314 F. Supp. 697
(D. Conn. 1970).
'1 538 F.2d at 19.
21 Id. The damage to the group's professional reputation was deemed irremediable since
money damages could not adequately compensate the plaintiffs for the loss of a large audi-
ence. This audience loss, in turn, might seriously undermine the group's future plans for
distributing new shows in this country. Typical examples of irreparable harm involve produ-
cers of well-known products claiming damage to their reputation in the market. For instance,
in Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Watsky, 323 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), an injunction was
granted against cosmetic retailers who had sold imitations of Estee Lauder products. Interest-
ingly, the source of the counterfeit packages had not been pinpointed, and the judge agreed
with the retailer's claim that it was all but impossible to distinguish counterfeit from the
genuine product. Id. at 1066. Nevertheless, the court concluded:
[Tihe counterfeits are so nearly identical to the true that the public will without
question be led to believe that the spurious item is the real.
Lauder's name and reputation as a manufacturer of quality cosmetics . . . is
altogether at stake as long as the spurious packages and products circulate in the
market.
Id. at 1067.
Similarly, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
a preliminary injunction was granted against the manufacturer and distributor of a poster
which, in the well-known script letters of the Coca-Cola trademark, read "Enjoy Cocaine."
Unlike the Estee Lauder case, the difference between the products was apparent. The court
ruled, however, that the trademark was so uniquely identified with Coca-Cola products, and
the probability of confusion as to origin so high, as to make out the requisite showing of
irreparable harm. Id. at 1189-90.
2, Monty Python had sought the preliminary injunction only 11 days before the broadcast
scheduled for December 26. The difficulty inherent in-a last minute change of programming
plus the loss ABC would have suffered after having spent substantial amounts for advertising
convinced the district court to deny the injunction. On appeal, the Second Circuit found that
after the December 26th broadcast the possibility of injury to ABC was speculative. 538 F.2d
at 19.
1977]
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hood that Monty Python would succeed on the merits on both the
copyright infringement and Lanham Act claims.22 Discussing the
alleged copyright infringement, the court noted that the editing had
been both substantial,23 involving twenty-seven percent of the origi-
nal show, and in contravention of Monty Python's contractual
rights. 4 Focusing on the question of ownership of the copyright in
the recorded program, the Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs
that the issue need not be resolved since the program was merely a
derivative work25 based on the group's script, the copyright of which
was undisputed.26 The court reasoned that one who utilizes a deriva-
1 Id. at 19.
21 The Gilliam court recognized that some editing might be permissible in order to allow
for the different standards of taste of American audiences, but noted that express contractual
provisions will limit such rights. Id. at 23. See note 29 infra.
21 538 F.2d at 19.
2, Section 7 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1970), provides in part:
Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, transla-
tions, or other versions of works in the public domain or of copyrighted works when
produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or works
republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright
under the provisions of this title ....
Although the statute uses the words "new works," "derivative work" has been preferred as
the more accurate term. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 39, at 165-66. A derivative work has been
defined as a composition that "would be considered an infringing work" if the copyright
proprietor of the underlying work had not consented to the use of his copyright material. Id.,
at 167. As the Gilliam court noted, the copyrighting of the derivative work does not deprive
the underlying work of its copyright protection. 538 F.2d at 20, citing Grove Press, Inc. v.
Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Thus, the underlying work's
copyright may be infringed by an unauthorized use of the derivative work. See note 27 infra.
26 538 F.2d at 19. Ownership of a copyright, be it common law or statutory, is one of the
elements that must be established to make out a claim of infringement. 2 NIMMER, supra note
3, § 141. Since ABC did not challenge Monty Python's assertion of a common law copyright
in the script, the Gilliam court did not rule on the issue. 538 F.2d at 19-20 n.3. A common
law copyright, however, only protects works that have not been published. 1 NmfME, supra
note 3, § 11.2. Whether broadcast of the programs by ABC constituted a publication of the
script with the concomitant loss of common law copyright protection was a question left to
the lower court on remand. 538 F.2d at 20 n.3.
One author has described the common law copyright as follows: "Upon the creation of
of a song, a book, a play or a painting, to name but a few examples, the creator possesses an
intangible property right, usually referred to as a common law copyright." S. ROTHENBG,
LEGAL PROTECTION OF LITERATURE, ART AND MUSIC § 1 (1960). Common law copyright includes
the right to withhold one's creation from the world indefinitely, but it does not include
complete ownership of the work. Such ownership implies that the owner "may use his prop-
erty in a reasonable manner without fear of strangers safely making similar use of it for their
own profit or to his detriment." Id. But reasonable use of a work covered by common law
copyright results in loss of the right, since upon publication the work "falls into the public
domain . . . [and is] freely available to everyone." Id. It is at this point that common law
copyright protection ceases and the statutory scheme comes into play. Until publication,
however, statutory copyright law normally has no application. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, §
93.1.
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tive work runs the risk of infringing on the underlying work if his
use of the program exceeds the license originally granted by the
proprietor of the copyright of the underlying work.27 Although this
rationale is most often applied where a licensee exceeds contractual
time and media restrictions,18 the copyright holder's right to control
his work is similarly violated when contractual provisions restricting
editing are exceeded. Stating that ABC's defenses did not seem
"meritorious at this stage of the litigation," 9 the court concluded
that there was a substantial probability that plaintiffs would suc-
ceed at trial. "
Although this showing of a copyright infringement claim was
sufficient in itself to support the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
" 538 F.2d at 20. The Gilliam court relied on Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a case involving a dramatization of Edith Wharton's
famous novel, Ethan Frome. The Davis court held that a television script, based on a screen-
play which in turn was based on another play, infringed the copyright of the underlying play.
Id. at 632; accord, Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) (unauthorized use of 1944
version of plaintiff's song infringement of underlying 1935 copyright); Grove Press, Inc. v.
Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (copying uncopyrighted transla-
tion infringes copyrighted original novel).
" See, e.g., Rice v. American Program Bureau, 446 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1971) (right to
license nondramatic performances of songs does not include right to license production of
entire rock opera); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968) (production on television not a violation of media restriction when
right to copyright, adapt, and exhibit given); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951) (grant of motion picture rights limited
to term of book's copyright absent a right to renew).
23 538 F.2d at 21. ABC first contended that Monty Python had ratified BBC's grant of
editing privileges to ABC. The court rejected this argument, remarking that Monty Python's
representatives had continually sought assurances that the program would not be edited. Id.
at 21-22.
Alternatively, ABC argued that the program was a joint work of BBC and Monty Python.
Id. at 22. Because joint authors own a work in undivided shares and may license it without
each other's permission, a finding that the program was a joint work necessarily would
recognize the right of BBC to grant unlimited editing rights to ABC. See 1 NIMMER, supra
note 3, §§ 67-68. Interpreting the terms of the contract as clearly reserving to Monty Python
superior rights in the script, the court refused to accept this argument. 538 F.2d at 22. Cf.
Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 242 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957)
(contract terms negate finding of joint authorship).
Finally, the court turned to ABC's claim that Monty Python had impliedly consented
to the editing. It is generally agreed that the parties to a licensing agreement are deemed
aware of and incorporate into their agreement prevailing industry practices, such as cutting
and editing for television. See Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954). Courts, however, have always recognized the right to
contract otherwise. See, e.g., Preminger v. Columbia.Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267
N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 25 App. Div. 2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913
(1st Dep't), affd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966). The Gilliam
court declared that both the restrictive terms of the Monty Python agreement and the group's
continual objections to any editing militated against a finding of implied consent.
11 538 F.2d at 21.
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:349
tion, the court then discussed the plaintiffs' claim that ABC had
violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 31 by identifying plaintiffs
as authors of what was in fact a "mere caricature" of their work. 31
Acknowledging that this cause of action for mutilation is derived
from the moral right theory which is not embodied in the Copyright
Act, Judge Lumbard nevertheless reasoned that artists, due to their
financial dependence on the public, must be afforded protection
against mutilation of their works if the economic protection of the
Copyright Act is to be meaningful.3 3 To achieve this end, the court
found a probable violation of the Lanham Act's prohibition against
misrepresentations damaging to one's business or personal reputa-
tion. Moreover, the Second Circuit declared that plaintiffs, upon
establishing an actionable mutilation, may be entitled to a perma-
nent injunction, and not merely a legend disassociating themselves
from the program. 4
The Gilliam court's recognition that mutilation of a work may
result in a misrepresentation violative of the Lanham Act is novel.35
More importantly, the suggestion that a permanent injunction
might issue to prevent all further use of the work constitutes an
expansive interpretation of the remedies available under the Act.3 1
31 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), quoted in note 10 supra.
32 538 F.2d at 25.
Id. at 24.
" Id. at 25 n.13.
Traditionally, the Lanham Act has governed only trademarks. A trademark is a word
or symbol adopted by a merchant to point out the origin or ownership of a product and to
enable the public to distinguish the products of one merchant or manufacturer from those of
another. See A. SEIDEL, S. DUBROFF, & E. GONDA, 1 TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.01-
.11 (1963). Typically, cases under the Act have concerned two similar products with similar
names, the existence of which creates the possibility that consumers will think both origi-
nated from the same source. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Chandris America Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The Greatest Show
on Earth" describing circus and "The Greatest Show on Earth Isn't" describing cruise);
Sterling Prods. Co. v. Crest Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Mich. 1970) "Litter Basket"
and "Litter Bin"). Mislabeling of products is another source of much litigation under the Act.
See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Major Brands, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
Unauthorized use of another's trademark in an attempt to capitalize on the original produ-
cer's reputation or goodwill is also a clear violation of the Act. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v.
Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc.,
335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Watsky, 323 F. Supp. 1064
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (sale by drugstores of products indistinguishable from plaintiff's cosmetics).
11 A more limited form of injunctive relief, preventing further use of the trademark or
description, is routinely granted. See, e.g., HMH Publishing Co. v. Turner, 222 F. Supp. 145
(N.D. Ga. 1963), aff'd, 380 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967). In the
typical Lanham Act case, however, the defendant may continue to distribute his product as
long as the description or trademark it bears is not deceptive. See, e.g., Mortellito v. Nina of
California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Gilliam court's declaration that an
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By interpreting the Act in so liberal a manner, the Gilliam court
evidenced an increased sensitivity to an artist's right to prevent
mutilation or distortion of his work,37 a right long recognized under
the European moral right theory.
Unlike American copyright law, the doctrine of moral right is
directed not towards protecting the artist's economic interests, 8 but
towards guaranteeing, among other things, the integrity of the work
and the artist's right to be known as its creator. The Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,4" an interna-
tional copyright agreement incorporating these rights, provides in
part:
Independently of the author's economic rights, . . the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object
injunction against dissemination of the entire work may be the only way to adequately protect
Monty Python's reputation indicates an expansion of the injunctive remedies available under
the Act. See text accompanying notes 52-59 infra.
37 The court underscored the problems confronting an artist whose creation has been
substantially altered and then publicly displayed. As the Second Circuit noted: 'To deform
his work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes
him subject to criticism for work he has not done."' 538 F.2d at 24, quoting Roeder, supra
note 4, at 569.
One commentator, criticizing the limitations of the American approach, noted:
When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a
musician, he does more than bring into the world a unique object having exploitive
possibilities; he projects into the world part of his personality and subjects it to the
ravages of public use. There are possibilities of injury to the creator other than
merely economic ones; these the copyright statute does not protect. Nor is the
interest of society in the integrity of its cultural heritage protected by the copyright
statute.
Roeder, supra note 4, at 557 (footnote omitted).
31 In the words of a recent commentator:
By virtue of the paternity right, an author may rightfully insist on being publicly
known as creator of his published work; as a corollary, he may also prevent the use
of another person's name as the author of his work. In addition he may prohibit
the use of his name on a work which is not his own, or on a work of his own which
has been distorted, altered, or otherwise changed without his consent.
The right to the integrity of the work permits the author to prohibit or to
maintain control over any alterations, additions, deletions or changes in content,
style, format, etc. of his work.
Comment, Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 793, 799 (1975) (footnotes
omitted). See generally Roeder, supra note 4, at 561-73. The individual rights encompassed
by the moral right theory in its most expansive form are outlined in note 4 supra.
11 The Berne Convention protects the unpublished works of citizens of foreign nations
as well as all works first published in a member nation. Established to replace the numerous
treaties then in existence, the Convention has simplified and standardized copyright laws in
member countries, which, in signing, declared themselves to be "animated by the desire to
protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary
and artistic works . . . ." Berne Convention, supra note 4, Preamble.
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to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.4'
These so-called moral rights are personal, not property rights,4 2 and
provide a basis for relief regardless of economic damage or posses-
sion of a copyright. American courts have long refused to adopt the
moral right theory in its entirety as part of our law,43 preferring to
Id. art. 6(1) (bis).
12 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 110.1. See generally note 4 supra.
13 See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947) (denial of injunction to
prevent publication of sketches without artist's name); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (owner of cartoons may manufacture dolls of cartoon characters
without artist's consent); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d
813 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949) (denial of artist's right to damages for destruction of his
work). In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948), aff'd mem., 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (lst Dep't 1949),
plaintiffs, internationally known Soviet composers, sought to enjoin the distribution of an
anti-Soviet film entitled "The Iron Curtain," which used plaintiffs' works as background
music. 196 Misc. at 68, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77. Although the court indicated that the moral
right theory might have some application in the United States, it denied relief since there
had been no distortion of the composition and the composers' works did not enjoy copyright
protection. Id. at 70-71, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79. Absent a copyright, it is settled in the United
States that published works are in the public domain and may be copied by anyone. See
generally Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1960); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Pub-
lishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Interestingly, when the same dispute was
subsequently litigated in France, the French court found definite moral damage and ordered
the film seized. Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through
Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1544-45 (1972).
Many commentators have speculated as to the reasons underlying American adherence
to the economic rather than the moral right approach to artistic protection. Clearly, the fact
that American copyight statutes were, to a large extent, derived from the preexisting, eco-
nomically oriented English scheme partially explains the current status of American law. See
Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Exist-
ing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1542 (1972). See generally Comment,
Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 793, 803-08 (1975). The United
Kingdom, however, has modified its position and is currently a member of the Berne Union.
A. KENT & H. LANCOUR, COPYRIGHT: CURRENT VIEWPOINTS ON HISTORY, LAWS, LEGISLATION 9,
app. 1 (1972). It has been suggested that the true reason is that the American preoccupation
with exploitation of the country's vast natural wealth has drawn attention away from the
protection of the arts and has resulted in underdevelopment of American legal doctrine in
this area. Roeder, supra note 4, at 557. In contrast, one court has ascribed the American
judiciary's reluctance to adopt the European view to the connotations of the term "moral
right" and the breadth of the concept:
(a) "Moral right" seems to indicate to some persons something . . . meta-legal.
(b) The "moral right" doctrine, as applied in some countries, includes very exten-
sive rights which courts in some American jurisdictions are not yet prepared to
acknowledge; as a result, the phrase "moral right" seems to have frightened some
of those courts to such an extent that they have unduly narrowed artists' rights.
(c) Finally, it is not always an unmitigated boon to devise and employ such a
common name.
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (footnotes omitted).
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protect, under the guise of various other legal doctrines4  only a few
of the rights encompassed by the European theory. Following this
approach, the Gilliam court brought the right to prevent deforma-
tion within the ambit of the Lanham Act,45 thus finding it unneces-
sary to utilize the moral right theory.
Prior to Gilliam, few courts had even intimated that distortion
or mutilation of an artist's work might be actionable under the
Lanham Act.48 In Jaeger v. American International Pictures, Inc.,47
the director of a German film sued the American distributors, alleg-
ing that the English language version of the film was garbled and
distorted. The court commented:
Whether or not there is any square counterpart in American law
of the "moral right" of artists assertedly recognized on the Euro-
pean continent, there is enough in plaintiff's allegations to suggest
that he may yet be able to prove a charge of unfair competition or
otherwise tortious misbehavior in the distribution to the public of
a film that bears his name but at the same time severely garbles,
distorts or mutilates his work. It is at least arguable that there is
a claim under the Lanham Act. . . in the charge that defendant
" See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
538 F.2d at 24-25. Judge Gurfein, while not dissenting from the majority's view that a
cause of action under the Lanham Act existed in favor of Monty Python, emphasized that
the Act "does not deal with artistic integrity." Id. at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring). He noted
that "[s]o far as the Lanham Act is concerned, it is not a substitute for droit moral which
authors in Europe enjoy." Id.
18 See Autry v. Republic Prods. Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858
(1954); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Autry,
the court found that plaintiff's licensing agreement with defendants permitted cutting and
editing for television, and thus the Lanham Act was inapplicable. 213 F.2d at 669. The court
implied, however, that in other cases severe editing might give rise to such a claim:
[W]e can conceive that some such cutting and editing could result in emasculating
the motion pictures so that they would no longer contain substantially the same
motion and dynamic and dramatic qualities which it was the purpose of the artist's
employment to produce.
Id.
Although not specifically addressing a Lanham Act claim, other courts have implied that
an artist may have some protection against dissemination of a garbled version of his work.
See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1952); Preminger v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 594 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 25
App. Div. 2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't), afl'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431,
273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966). In Preminger, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the exhibi-
tion of the motion picture "Anatomy of a Murder" in edited form. The court ruled that minor
cuts were permissible in the discretion of local stationmasters, but that extensive editing,
such as cutting 61 minutes of film from the movie, may constitute actionable mutilation. 49
Misc. 2d at 371-72, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
,1 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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represents to the public that what the plaintiff had nothing to do
with is the plaintiffs product .... "I
Thus, the Jaeger court suggested that proof of mutilation resulting
in misrepresentation may give rise to a valid claim under the Act.
The Second Circuit's decision in Gilliam, at first glance, might
be read to support the view that proof of mutilation alone is suffi-
cient to state a claim under the Act. Viewed thusly, Gilliam would
closely approximate a moral right approach. 9 The terms of the Act
itself, however, require an element of misdescription.0 Thus, it
might be argued, as Judge Gurfein did in his concurring opinion,
that a legend clearly disassociating the group from the program
would suffice to prevent future violations, thereby affording plain-
tiffs adequate relief." Although this view is consistent with other
decisions discussing the remedies available under the Act,5 2 it
should be noted that the circumstances in the earlier decisions differ
significantly from those in Gilliam. For example, in Potato Chip
Institute v. General Mills, Inc.,5 3 it was the description, not the
product itself, that was in issue. General Mills manufactured an
artificial snack food advertised as a potato chip. An explanatory
phrase distinguishing this product from natural potato chips was
held to be sufficient to avoid confusion. 4 Certainly, in a situation
Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
' Under the moral rights theory, the artist, upon proof of mutilation, may obtain injunc-
tive relief and money damages. See Roeder, supra note 4, at 574. If Gilliam is interpreted as
providing similar relief solely upon proof of mutilation, the effect of the decision may be to
afford the American artist rights under the Lanham Act similar to those afforded the Euro-
pean artist by the moral right theory.
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), quoted in note 10 supra. As the court in Smith v.
Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968), observed: .'In any proceeding under the Lanham
Act the gist of the proceeding is a false description or representation,' . . . or a use of the
mark which 'is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers .... '" Id. at
565, quoting Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexan-
der's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1962) (citations omitted).
11 538 F.2d at 26-27 (Gurfein, J., concurring). Judge Gurfein stated: "The misdescription
of origin can be dealt with, as Judge Lasker did below, by devising an appropriate legend to
indicate that the plaintiffs had not approved the editing of the ABC version. With such a
legend, there is no conceivable violation of the Lanham Act." Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). In
the district court, Judge Lasker had ordered that a statement disassociating Monty Python
from the program because of the editing be broadcast during the special. The Second Circuit
granted a stay of that order and permitted ABC to air the program with a statement that it
had been edited by the network. Id. at 18.
52 See note 36 supra.
461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
Id. at 1089-90. The lower court had enjoined General Mills from advertising Chipos as
potato chips without a prominent notation that the product was made from dried or dehy-
drated potatoes. "Fashioned from dried potato granules" was considered a sufficient explana-
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where the plaintiffs seek mere accuracy of description, an order
requiring a clear label or explanation is sufficient 5 Similarly, in
Rich v. RCA Corp.,5" the defendant record company was enjoined
from marketing a record consisting of songs recorded by plaintiff
more than 10 years previously, in a record jacket with a current
photograph of him. Finding a likelihood of confusion or decep-
tion,5" the court enjoined further sales, but implied that distribution
of the record in the same jacket with a clear legend stating the date
of the recording would not result in a violation of the Act.59
It is submitted that the Gilliam majority's suggestion that a
permanent injunction might issue is justifiable on the facts pre-
sented in view of the special problems inherent in the television
medium. Noting that viewers might tune in on the broadcast at any
time, the court questioned whether "a few words could erase the
indelible impression that is made by a television broadcast,""0 and
concluded that a serious probability of a misrepresentation remains,
even when a disclaimer is aired simultaneously with the broadcast.
The same considerations clearly seem to apply when the violative
tion to avoid customer confusion. Potato Chip Inst. v. General Mills, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 173,
181 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
" Even where the confusion arises from the similarity of two products, an order requiring
a clear label has been held to be the only relief appropriate under the Act. See Mortellito v.
Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), wherein the court, despite
a finding that defendant's needlework designs were markedly similar to plaintiff's, granted
an injunction which proscribed only the use by the defendant of the word "Nina" on any of
its products.
"6 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
57 Id. at 531. A recent photograph of Rich appeared on the front and back covers of the
album. Four of the ten songs listed were marked with an asterisk, indicating that these were
"previously released selections." It was not indicated when the songs were actually recorded
and the only date appearing on the jacket and the album itself was 1974. Id.
51 Id. Actual proof that persons have been misled is not required in order to obtain
injunctive relief. See Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965); Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc.,
372 F. Supp. 1, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288,
1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Such proof, however, will undoubtedly strengthen the plaintiff's case.
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), for example,
the court noted that the plaintiff had received complaints from numerous customers who had
assumed that Coca-Cola had sponsored a poster proclaiming, "Enjoy Cocaine," in Coca-Cola
script. Id. at 1188-89.
11 390 F. Supp. at 531.
1 538 F.2d at 25 n.13.
61 Judge Gurfein indicated that the district court should fashion an order which would
adequately deal with the continuing possibility of confusion. But, aside from stating that the
legend could be broadcast at various intervals and not just at the beginning of the show, he
did not suggest how the confusion could be overcome. See id. at 27 & n.1 (Gurfein, J.,
concurring).
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work is in the form of a radio show, or, to a lesser extent, a movie.
One intriguing question left open in the wake of Gilliam is whether
permanent injunctive relief will be extended beyond these rather
ephemeral media events.62 Essentially, future application of perma-
nent injunctions depends on which element of the court's rationale
is emphasized. If the mutilation aspect is stressed, a permanent
injunction may issue. If, on the other hand, the misrepresentation
aspect is stressed, a clear notation disassociating the author from
the altered work should be sufficient.
The Gilliam decision represents an important step towards the
development of a more comprehensive body of principles by which
certain artistic endeavors may be afforded complete protection. Al-
though Gilliam follows in the tradition of other courts which have
developed such protections in piecemeal fashion by application of
various common law principles,13 the decision is unique in that the
Second Circuit has provided a federal cause of action encompassing
the artist's right to prevent deiormation11 More significant perhaps,
is that the court has gone beyond the traditional American ap-
proach, and has expressly acknowledged the importance of the art-
ist's intangible interest in the presentation of his work free from
distortion or mutilation. By holding that mutilation which results
in misrepresentation is actionable under the Lanham Act and may
justify the grant of a permanent injunction against dissemination of
the altered work, the court has recognized the needs of artists for
redress against nonpecuniary injury.
Joanne T. Marren
62 For example, it is unclear whether an author would be entitled to an injunction under
the Lanham Act were his book, edited without consent, published with a clear disclaimer of
authorship on the jacket. Arguably, the disclaimer, visible at all times to the reader, would
adequately remedy the claimed misdescription. On the other hand, musical works, such as
operas, symphonies, or stage might require the more comprehensive relief that a permanent
injunction would provide. A disclaimer in the program or even an announcement before the
beginning of the performance might easily fade from a viewer's mind, while the performance
itself would tend to leave a lasting impression.
See notes 5-8 supra.
" The recognition of a federal cause of action favors the purpose of the copyright clause
to provide uniform national protection for science and the arts. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 3,
§ 1.1.
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